Popper and the Epistemic Problem of Truthlikeness

Authors

  • Sebastián Nicolás Díaz Oyarzún University of Concepción

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.69967/07194773.v1i12.126

Keywords:

Popper, Truthlikeness, epistemic problem, knowledge, certainty

Abstract

In some parts of his work Karl Popper seems to be providing a positive solution to the epistemic problem of truthlikeness, that is, the problem of how do we know or rationally claim that one theory is closer to the truth than another. However, in other parts he seems to be saying just the opposite. In this paper it will be argue that there is no contradiction between these Popper’s assertions. It will be hold that the key of this matter lies in his very strict conception of knowledge, which supposes that something is only known when one is certain of it.

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Author Biography

Sebastián Nicolás Díaz Oyarzún, University of Concepción

Professor of Philosophy and Master of Philosophy at the University of Concepción. Concepcion, Chile.

References

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Published

2019-06-15

How to Cite

Díaz Oyarzún, S. N. (2019). Popper and the Epistemic Problem of Truthlikeness. Mutatis Mutandis: Revista Internacional De Filosofía, 1(12), 115–125. https://doi.org/10.69967/07194773.v1i12.126

Issue

Section

Research Articles