Learning from Experience

A Reappraisal of Ayer's Interpretation of Hume's Empiricism

Abstract

I propose to address two under-examined aspects of Alferd Ayer's contribution to the understanding of Hume's philosophy: his consideration of the inferential nature of perception and his proposal that experience has a public status. First, I will analyze how the Humean conception of experience has been understood. I will argue that Ayer's interpretation contributes to modifying the private and atomistic conception of experience that is usually attributed to Hume, by stating that in order to recognize an object, a simple act of perception is not enough, but it is required to establish a connection with a network of past perceptions. Secondly, I will analyze whether the mental nature of perceptions implies that their access is given only through introspection or if Hume himself contemplates the possibility that they can be communicated. Ayer argues that it is possible to attribute a public character to perceptions since he understands them as a series of sensory patterns that do not have traces of personal belonging but can be singled out from their occurrence at a specific time and place. This interpretation gives rise to his theory of the "world of common sense," which goes beyond what Hume proposes but is not contradictory to the main postulates of his philosophy.