John Rawls theory of justice and the role of reasonableness

Abstract

In this paper I want to show the importance of the concept of reasonableness in John Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness, as well as explain the problem of reasonableness in this theory, namely, about the accusation of epistemological weakness, excessiveness and ineffectiveness. The starting point will be to stress the requirement of reasonableness that is made to the moral and political agent in justice as fairness. Later, I will identify some criticism about these criteria. I will show the criticism made by Estlund about the insularity of the concept of reasonableness and the necessity of truth for justification, and the criticism established by Timmons and Gaus regarding the requirement of reasonableness as excessive and ineffective too. In the next step, I shall try to respond to these criticisms, and in the final part of the text I try to reflect on the value of pluralism within the theory of justice as fairness.