Consciousness as a thematic bridge between phenomenology and analytical philosophy
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.69967/07194773.v1i9.41Keywords:
analytical philosophy, phenomenology, higher-order theory, self-representational theories, phenomenal consciousness, pre-reflective consciousnessAbstract
Usually the relation between phenomenology, as part of so-called continental philosophy, and analytic philosophy is shown as a conflict. But this does not have to be like this. That is the reason for this work. To do this, a thematic bridge will be drawn, bridging the gap between phenomenology and analytic philosophy. That bridge will be the reflections on consciousness by higher order theories in general and self-representational theory, specifically, as representatives of analytic philosophy, and phenomenology. In this way it will be shown that philosophies that at first appear as conflicting can be reconciled because their approaches on a theme are similar. The above will be achieved through an affirmation, a negation and a correction.
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