The Ambiguity” [zweideutigkeit] of Values: Nietzsche versus The Morality

Abstract

Nietzsche's critique of morality has been seen only in a destructive light, rather than as a profound analysis of the structure of values. For Nietzsche the foundation of morality fails not only because of the weaknesses of "metaphysical philosophy" [metaphysische Philosophie], but above all because of the “ambiguity” [Zweideutigkeit] internal to the structure of each value expressed in its relation to other values. We propose “ambiguity” [Zweideutigkeit] as the key to access this critique, deployed on three levels that act as a classificatory tool to dissect it in detail: 1) historical-cultural, level, grasped through a "historical philosophy" [historische Philosophie] that manifests the layers of meaning of phenomena and concepts; 2) functional-structural level, manifested in the critique of "consciousness" [Bewusstsein] as the generative source of our mental life, as a means of access to values; and, 3) level of the intertwining of values, internal level, as a phenomenon of indeterminacy that prevents us from judging any agent as the one responsible for his acts due both to the lack of fixed and differentiated frameworks of valuation and to the lack of a stable concept of identity. Both problems call into question the idea of freedom.