Eternity and Human Salvation in Spinoza’s Ethics

Abstract

In Spinoza’s Ethics, temporal concepts (as Eternity and Duration) are based on an Ontology of the necessary and immanent Being. Contrary to what Spinoza maintained in the Metaphysical Thoughts, here the division of Being —into Being whose essence implies existence, and Being whose essence implies a possible existence — is no longer the criterion for deriving the definitions of Eternity and of Duration. From its beginning, the posthumous work affirms the absolute determination of the Real. As one of the main contributions to the secondary bibliography, and to ethical philosophy in general, the aim of this article is to elucidate, in the context of the ontology of immanence, what Eternity is for Spinoza, why it is distinguished from Duration, and to which realities both apply. We will also try to understand what it means that things that last or currently exist, can nevertheless be eternal, in a perspective —like that of this text— whose horizon is that of determining the good life of men and their salvation.