Memory and recollection

Authors

  • Alejandro Tomasini Bassols National Autonomous University of Mexico

Keywords:

memory, image, remember, know, experience, Wittgenstein, Hacker, Bennett

Abstract

In this paper I try to give a Wittgensteinian kind of answer to two questions, namely, what is the place of memory in our lives and how do we incorporate the concept of remembering into our conceptual apparatus. One of my goals is to show that certain traditional problemas linked to memories are genuine pseudo-problems. In particular, I try to make clear that ‘remember’ does not point to an experience.

Author Biography

Alejandro Tomasini Bassols, National Autonomous University of Mexico

Bachelor in philosophy, UNAM; Master of Letters, University of Oxford; Doktorat Nauk Humanistycznych, Uniwersytet Warszawski. Author of "Los Atomismos Lógicos de Russell y Wittgenstein", "Filosofía de la Religión", ""Lenguaje y Anti-Metafísica", "Ensayos de Filosofía de la Psicología", "Pena Capital y Otros Ensayos", "Lecciones Wittgensteinianas", "Pecados Capitales y Filosofía", "Tópicos Wittgensteinianos".

References

Malcolm, N, (1963), “Three Lectures on Memory” en Knowledge and Certainty. Essays and Lecture, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.
Russell, B (1980), The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wittgenstein, L., (1974), Philosophical Investigations, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Wittgenstein, L., 1978: Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, London: Allen and Unwin.

Published

2015-06-15

How to Cite

Tomasini Bassols, A. (2015). Memory and recollection. Mutatis Mutandis: Revista Internacional De Filosofía, 1(4), 11–26. Retrieved from https://revistamutatismutandis.com/index.php/mutatismutandis/article/view/108