Can animals have rights without duties? Animals as subjects and citizens

Abstract

In this paper, I will review one of the standard arguments to refute that animals can be considered subjects of law. The argument holds that animals cannot be subjects of law because they cannot assume duties. The canonical way to respond to this question is to appeal to the arguments of "species overlap" -there are humans without that feature that are nonetheless subject of rights- and the "moral relevance" -highlighting the irrelevance of that incapability to gain right’s protection. At the legal level, both arguments translate into the fact that de facto incapacity is not an obstacle to being a subject of law -in the human case-. Although all this is obvious, the argument of obligations persists in rulings and doctrine. In this paper, I will take the obligations argument seriously and propose that the way to refute it is to review the political theory that supports it. That theory will be evaluated in light of Donaldson and Kymlicka's proposal of citizenship for other animals. In their theoretical proposal, the authors argue that animals can and do fulfill some obligations in today's interspecies societies.