The antinaturalist arguments by Moore
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.69967/07194773.v1i1.60Keywords:
naturalistic fallacy, argument of the open question, Moore, good, naturalism, ethicsAbstract
En este artículo defiendo al naturalismo ético de los argumentos que G. E. Moore presenta en su Principia Ethica. Utilizo la distinción fregeana entre sentido y referencia para argumentar que el naturalismo ético no necesariamente comete la llamada falacia naturalista. Sobre el argumento de la pregunta abierta sostengo que lo más que podría mostrar es que ‘bueno’ y cualquier definición que se dé de este concepto no son sinónimos, mas no demuestra la imposibilidad de definir ‘bueno’. Por último señalo que si ‘bueno’ no fuera un objeto natural se entraría en contradicción con la tesis de la clausura causal, causando graves problemas ontológicos y epistemológicos. Concluyo que los argumentos de Moore no afectan al naturalismo ético.
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